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Abstract
The fifth generation (5G) and beyond wireless networks are critical to support diverse vertical
applications by connecting heterogeneous devices and machines, which directly increase vulnerability
for various spoofing attacks. Conventional cryptographic and physical layer authentication techniques
are facing some challenges in complex dynamic wireless environments, including significant security
overhead, low reliability, as well as difficulties in pre-designing a precise authentication model,
providing continuous protection, and learning time-varying attributes. In this article, we envision
new authentication approaches based on machine learning techniques by opportunistically leveraging
physical layer attributes, and introduce intelligence to authentication for more efficient security
provisioning. Machine learning paradigms for intelligent authentication design are presented, namely
for parametric/non-parametric and supervised/unsupervised/reinforcement learning algorithms. In a
nutshell, the machine learning-based intelligent authentication approaches utilize specific features in
the multi-dimensional domain for achieving cost-effective, more reliable, model-free, continuous, and
situation-aware device validation under unknown network conditions and unpredictable dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
The 5G-and-beyond wireless networks have received tremendous attentions in both academia
and industries alike, which will enable a wide variety of vertical applications by connecting
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2heterogeneous devices and machines [1]. The dramatically growing number of low-cost
devices and access points with increased mobility and heterogeneity leads to the extremely
complex and dynamic environment of 5G-and-beyond wireless networks. Specifically, due to
the open broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, widely adopted standardized transmis-
sion protocols, and intermittent communication characteristic, wireless communications are
extremely vulnerable to interception and spoofing attacks [2]. As shown in the conventional
‘Alice-Bob-Eve’ model of Fig. 1, Alice and Bob are legitimate devices and communicate
with each other in the presence of a Spoofer (Eve). This adversary dynamically intends to
intercept legitimate communications and to impersonate Alice for obtaining illegal advantages
from Bob. The main objective of Bob is to uniquely and unambiguously identify Alice by
authentication techniques.
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Fig. 1: Alice-Bob-Eve model in the complex time-varying environment. Bob identifies Alice
from Spoofer based on the multi-dimensional received information, which may be related to
communication links, physical environment, and communication process, just to name a few.
Although cryptographic techniques have been widely studied for authentication, they may
fall short of the desired performance in many emerging scenarios of 5G-and-beyond wireless
networks [2]. The fundamental weaknesses of conventional cryptography techniques are the
increasing latencies, communication and computation overheads for achieving better
security performance, which are extremely undesirable for the delay-sensitive communications
and resource-constraint devices. To be specific, appropriate key management procedures are
necessary for the conventional cryptographic techniques, and cooperation among multiple
entities is required for both ring and group signature, leading to excessive latencies and
3significant communication overhead. Furthermore, due to the disregard of inherent features
of communicating devices, detecting compromised security keys cannot be readily achieved
by the conventional digital credentials-based techniques [2].
Physical layer authentication provides an alternative approach of validating a device by
exploiting the communication link, device, and location-related attributes, as exemplified
by channel impulse response (CIR) [2], channel frequency response (CFR) in orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) [3], received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [2],
carrier frequency offset (CFO) [4], and radio frequency fingerprint (RFF) [5]. Such time-
varying attributes are inherently related to the unique imperfection of communicating devices
and corresponding environment, which provide specific distinguishing features and natural
dynamic protections for legitimate communications.
CHALLENGES FOR EXISTING PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION
Physical layer authentication has many advantages, such as low computational requirement
and network overhead [6]–[8], but it also faces many challenges. The main reason is that
most of the existing physical layer authentication techniques rely on static mechanisms while
encountering the complex and dynamic wireless environment of 5G-and-beyond wireless
networks. To be more specific, we summarize the challenges for existing physical layer
authentication techniques as follows.
Low reliability when using single attribute: Performance of the single attribute-based
physical layer authentication schemes suffers from the imperfect estimates and variations
of the selected attribute [2]. Moreover, the limited range of specific attribute distribution may
not be sufficient for differentiating transmitters all the time. This limits the performance of
single attribute-based authentication schemes in many universal applications, such as mobile
device security.
Difficulty in pre-designing a precise authentication model: Most of the existing physical
layer authentication schemes are model-based, as exemplified by [3], [4], which may be
deteriorated when it is operated in a complex time-varying environment. More importantly,
tremendous amounts of data and a priori knowledge are required for obtaining the accu-
rate channel model, which are obviously undesirable for those mobile networks, such as
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks and vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). Hence,
it is challenging to pre-design a precise authentication model for supporting new applications
4of 5G-and-beyond wireless networks.
Impediment to continuous protection of legitimate devices: Most of the existing authen-
tication schemes are static in time and binary in nature, which means that the devices either
pass or fail the authentication, thus leading to the one-time hard verification [3], [4]. Due to
the intermittent communications between Alice and Bob, these schemes may be limited in
detecting Spoofer after the initial login and in addressing varying security risks.
Challenge of learning time-varying attributes: Authentication performance of the existing
static authentication schemes could be severely affected by the unpredictable variations of
attributes due to the potential decorrelation at different time instants and device mobility.
Hence, the variations of attributes increase the uncertainty for adversaries, but decrease the
authentication accuracy of legitimate devices operating without learning the diverse attributes
as well.
Due to these existing security weaknesses, the authentication enhancement and the efficient
security provisioning are of paramount importance for 5G-and-beyond wireless networks, es-
pecially in the light of the proliferation of low-cost devices for vertical industrial applications.
AUTHENTICATION WITH INTELLIGENCE
In this article, we envision intelligent authentication approaches with the help of machine
learning to address the above challenges for security enhancement and more efficient man-
agement in 5G-and-beyond networks, which are different from the works of [10]–[12]. As
illustrated in Fig. 2, the 5G-and-beyond networks are expected to provide wide services having
high communication and security performance as well as privacy preserving transmissions.
Based on these basic requirements, the intelligent authentication is required to meet multi-
objectives, namely for high cost efficiency, high reliability, model independence, continuous
protection, and situation awareness. More importantly, the flexible designs of security manage-
ment are extremely helpful in providing automatic authentication in different 5G-and-beyond
communication scenarios, which are presented in different colors inside the pentagon of Fig.
2. Meeting these multi-objectives supports the advantages of intelligent authentication based
on machine learning as follows:
• High cost efficiency: Due to the increasing number of resource-constraint devices in 5G-
and-beyond wireless applications, both communication and security management should
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Fig. 2: Requirements and multi-objectives of intelligent authentication in 5G-and-beyond.
be executed concurrently to achieve cost-effective authentication. The opportunistic se-
lection of attributes and dimension reduction methods [2] may help in decreasing the
complexity of the authentication system relying on multi-dimensional attributes as well
as in reducing communication and computation overheads. Furthermore, by performing
training and testing with devices having enough energy and storage space, simplified and
fast authentication can be achieved at resource-constraint devices.
• High reliability: Utilizing specific features and relationships in the multi-dimensional
domain is extremely helpful for achieving security enhancement, since it is more difficult
for an adversary to succeed in predicting or imitating all attributes based on the received
signals and observations. To be more specific, the multi-dimensional information, such
as time, frequency, network architecture, and communication process, provides broader
protections for legitimate users. Machine learning techniques could facilitate the authen-
tication by analyzing and fusing the multi-dimensional information.
• Model independence: A data-based scheme through exploring machine learning tech-
niques overcomes the difficulties in modeling uncertainties and unknown dynamics of
the authentication process. Hence, the model-free authentication scheme removes the
assumption of knowing structures of authentication systems, resulting in a more scalable
authentication process design.
6• Continuous protection: Utilizing the received information along with data transmission
for authentication could provide identification after login and control the varying security
risks. In achieving this, machine learning techniques may be explored for data analysis
and processing, so that the seamless protection for legitimate devices can be achieved in
5G-and-beyond networks. Furthermore, continuous authentication may contribute to the
quick authentication handover.
• Situation awareness: The situation-aware authentication observes the varying security
risks and learns from the complex dynamic environment to enhance security. Machine
learning techniques provide powerful tools to learn the dynamic adversarial environment
for self-optimization and self-organization, thereafter for achieving the automatic authen-
tication. More importantly, machine learning techniques could help in the detection of
time-varying attributes and the adaptation of authentication process.
As a conclusion, by exploring machine learning techniques, we introduce the intelligence to
authentication in the complex time-varying environment under unknown network conditions
and unpredictable dynamics, supporting radically new applications of 5G-and-beyond wireless
networks.
DESIGN OF MACHINE LEARNING-AIDED INTELLIGENT AUTHENTICATION
As shown in Fig. 3, we present the design of machine learning-aided intelligent authen-
tication approaches by utilizing multi-dimensional attributes and by optimizing the holistic
authentication process.
Phase I: The time-varying multi-dimensional attributes are collected for authentication, which
may be estimated imperfectly having noises and measurement errors. Examples include the
physical layer attributes, network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks, and mobility
patterns. In a specific 5G-and-beyond wireless communication scenario, those attributes pro-
viding more information for authentication may be selected first. In details, the independent
attributes having a broader distribution range and a higher estimation accuracy could offer
more information for distinguishing different transmitters. By utilizing multi-dimensional at-
tributes as well as sharing the information among different layers and networks, the reliability
of authentication will be improved. Explicitly, the design of intelligent authentication only
relies on the estimation data of attributes without requiring a precise structure of the time-
varying attributes, e.g., the channel model, resulting in a model-free device validation.
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Fig. 3: Framework diagram of intelligent authentication design.
Phase II: The multi-dimensional attributes can be fused for authentication based on machine
learning techniques. An example is given in our previous work [2], which is a kernel machine
learning-based physical layer authentication scheme. More machine learning paradigms for
intelligent authentication will be summarized shortly. Considering the time-varying network
conditions, such as the resource limitations and uncertainties, the attributes may be oppor-
tunistically selected for dealing with both communication overhead and security management
concurrently. Furthermore, developing an appropriate machine learning algorithm and reduc-
ing the dimension of authentication system also benefit the communication performance, thus
cost-effective authentication will be achieved.
Phase III: The authentication for Alice and the Spoofer can be conducted based on the new
collection of multi-dimensional attributes. To achieve this, the regression or classification
model should be built based on the training data collected from Alice/Spoofer. Then the
authentication performance can be evaluated, and the authentication process can be adapted
to the complex time-varying environment by exploring machine learning to track the variations
of multi-dimensional attributes. Hence, the continuous and situation-aware process is proposed
for intelligent security provisioning in 5G-and-beyond applications.
8MACHINE LEARNING PARADIGMS FOR INTELLIGENT AUTHENTICATION
The family of machine learning algorithms can be categorized based on their functionality
and structure [1], yielding regression algorithms, decision tree algorithms, Bayesian algo-
rithms, clustering algorithms, and artificial neural networks, just to name a few. In this article,
we clarify the machine learning techniques from two perspectives: parametric/non-parametric
learning and supervised/unsupervised/reinforcement learning, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The
adjectives “parametric/non-parametric” indicate whether there are specific forms of training
functions, while “supervised/unsupervised” indicate whether there are labeled samples in the
database. The focus of reinforcement learning is finding a balance between exploration of
uncharted territory and the exploitation of current knowledge. We will introduce the basic
concepts and typical examples of these machine learning techniques, more importantly, discuss
their applications and possible requirements in designing intelligent authentication approaches
for different wireless communication scenarios.
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Fig. 4: Categories of machine learning (ML) techniques for intelligent authentication.
Parametric learning methods: The family of parametric learning methods has become
mature in the literature, as exemplified by the logistic regression, linear discriminant analysis,
perceptron, and naive Bayes, which require the specific form of training functions [13].
When the training functions related to the training samples (i.e., the collection of multi-
dimensional information) are selected appropriately, the parametric learning methods could
be more accurate, simpler, and require less training samples than the non-parametric learning
methods. For instance, the authors of [10] proposed a logistic regression-based authentication
scheme by utilizing the RSSI of transmitters for authentication enhancement assuming that
all the radio nodes are static.
9In the intelligent authentication schemes, the parametric learning methods could model
the attributes independently based on the specific form of training functions, so that the
uncertainties caused by the complex time-varying environment may be circumvented, as well
as the communication overhead and complexity of training may be adjusted adaptively by
opportunistically leveraging attributes. However, this kind of learning methods may be limited
in 5G-and-beyond wireless communication scenarios wherein the statistic properties and a
priori knowledge of attributes are not at hand.
Non-parametric learning methods: In contrast to parametric learning methods, the non-
parametric learning methods [1], [2], [13] are not specified a priori, but are determined from
the available data. Examples include kernel estimator, k-nearest neighbors, and decision trees,
just to name a few. A kernel machine-based scheme for intelligent physical layer authentication
process is proposed in [2]. The dimensionality of a multiple attribute-based authentication
system is reduced by the kernel function and the resultant authentication process can be
modeled as a linear system, thus decreasing the computation complexity of authentication
process, even though a large number of attributes are utilized. More importantly, the proposed
kernel learning algorithm tracks the time-varying attributes to enhance security based on
continuous device validation.
The non-parametric learning methods learn dynamically from time-varying environments
without requiring any assumptions concerning the training models. Beneficially, this provides
higher flexibility for the intelligent authentication, especially in those real-time authentication
scenarios, where the computational resources and time available for obtaining the statistical
properties of attributes and training functions are limited. However, compared with the para-
metric learning methods, they require more training data (i.e., collection of multi-dimensional
information and/or their corresponding labels) and may result in overfitting.
Supervised learning algorithms: The main difference between supervised and unsupervised
learning algorithms is that supervised learning requires the prior knowledge of outputs for the
corresponding inputs, while unsupervised learning algorithms do not need labeled outputs.
Some supervised machine learning algorithms are studied in [13] for defending against the
false data injection attacks, such as the perceptron, k-nearest neighbors, and support vector
machines (SVM). In intelligent authentication schemes, the choice between supervised or
unsupervised machine learning algorithms typically depends on the authentication problem
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and volume of training data at hand. A supervised learning algorithm is suitable when training
data and corresponding outputs of a legitimate communication session are straightforward to
obtain. More explicitly, the labeled outputs should be required near-instantaneously, so that the
adaptation of the authentication process may be achieved in real time. When labeled outputs
are not at hand, fast labeling techniques may be helpful for the supervised learning-based
intelligent authentication.
Unsupervised learning algorithms: In exploring this kind of algorithms, the learner (Bob)
exclusively receives unlabeled training data and makes predictions for all unseen points, as ex-
emplified by the K-means clustering [1]. In scenarios wherein the samples of Alice (estimates
of attributes) are much more than that of Spoofer, we may introduce unsupervised learning
algorithms for intelligent authentication. It is reasonable to assume that the observations of
Alice are much more than that of Spoofer, since the spoofing attacks fully rely on the Alice’s
behaviors for better attacking performance, including the transmission protocols and attributes.
Through applying unsupervised machine learning techniques for identifying Alice, the time
latency and energy consumption for labeling the outputs are significantly decreased in the
intelligent authentication process.
Reinforcement learning: This kind of techniques does not require accurate inputs and outputs
as well as precise parameter updates. A Q-learning-based authentication scheme is proposed
in [15] depending on the RSSI of signals to achieve the optimal test threshold and to
improve the authentication accuracy. However, it is also a static authentication scheme, and
may be unsuitable when the available resources and time are limited for obtaining complete
information, i.e., the environment and agent states as well as the immediate reward for each
action of devices.
To improve the authentication performance, we may utilize multi-dimensional attributes
in higher layers (e.g., application layer) and explore more precise information of Alice, but
her privacy may not be guaranteed. In other words, Bob may collect Alice’s information,
such as user behaviors and location-related features, for analyzing her habits, locations, and
other sensitive information during the authentication process, thus leading to privacy leakage
[9]. Hence, developing a privacy preserving authentication scheme based on the masking
methods [14] is helpful in protecting Alice’s private information during the authentication
process by adding obfuscation patterns on attribute measurements. However, there is a trade-
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off between privacy and data utility [14], thus resulting in a trade-off between privacy
preservation and authentication performance. To be specific, by adding obfuscation patterns
on attribute measurements, the information/contexts may be released to provably preserve
Alice’s privacy, while the authentication performance relying on the reduced accuracy of
attribute measurements will be decreased.
In order to explore a better trade-off between privacy preservation and authentication
performance, we may explore the masking-based privacy protection technique with spatial
and temporal aggregation of attributes’ measurements for intelligent authentication. Such
technique generates and aggregates obfuscation patterns for each attribute on Alice side
at a specific time instant t as H [t] = H [t] + γ[t], where H = (H1, H2, ..., HN)T and
γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γN)
T represent the estimates of N attributes used and generated obfuscation
patterns, respectively. More importantly, the obfuscation patterns are generated to ensure that
the fusion of H [t] for authentication by machine learning should be near to the fusion of
original attribute estimates H [t]. In achieving this, information sharing between different
layers of network architecture is required. When an attribute is not privacy-sensitive for
Alice, the obfuscation pattern superposed on this attribute should be set to zero, so that the
system capacity is guaranteed. As a conclusion, through the masking-based privacy protection
technique with the spatial aggregation and temporal aggregation, each sensitive attribute of
Alice has all properties of random number series, thus reveals no information to Bob.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A detailed comparison of conventional physical layer authentication and machine learning-
aided intelligent authentication techniques is given in Table I. To be more specific, differently
from the conventional techniques [3]–[5], machine learning-aided intelligent authentication
techniques make full use of both varying attributes and adaptive authentication processes,
and implicitly learn from data without the requirement of an exact attribute model. More
importantly, the machine learning-aided intelligent authentication techniques achieve cost-
effective, more reliable, model-free, continuous, and situation-aware device validation in the
complex time-varying environment, as exemplified by [2]. The cost is that they usually require
the appropriate selection of machine learning algorithms and elaborate design of authentication
processes, especially for delay-sensitive communications and resource-constraint devices.
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Authentication 
techniques
Typical 
characteristics
Conventional 
techniques
ML-aided intelli-
gent techniques
Model-based, static 
[3,4]
Cost-effective, reliable, 
model-free, continuous, 
situation-aware [2]
Security 
mechanisms
Hypothesis testing [3-
5]
Automatic adaptation, 
implicit learning from 
data without an exact 
attribute model [2]
Additional 
requirements
Statistical properties 
and exact models for 
varying attributes
Appropriate selection 
of ML algorithm and 
elaborate design of 
authentication process
Application 
limitations
Limited to complex dynamic 
environments having insuffi-
cient statistics of attributes
Limited to long continuous 
authentication process 
between low-power devices
TABLE I: Comparison between the conventional physical layer authentication and machine
learning (ML)-aided intelligent authentication techniques in complex time-varying 5G-and-
beyond wireless networks.
To demonstrate the performance of the developed intelligent authentication approach, Fig.
5 (a) compares the simulation results of the kernel machine learning-based intelligent au-
thentication scheme and the static authentication scheme relying on both multiple attributes
(i.e., CFO, CIR, and RSSI) and single attribute (i.e., CIR). The attribute estimates are gen-
erated based on the existing works of [2]–[5], and the attribute estimates of the Spoofer
are not required for training this intelligent authentication scheme, since it tracks Alice’s
attributes and authenticates the estimates that are different when coming from Alice and
the Spoofer. Estimates of Spoofer’s attributes for deriving misdetection rate are randomly
generated within the estimation ranges. We can observe from Fig. 5 (a) that both schemes
achieve a lower misdetection rate by exploring multiple attributes. The reason for this trend
is that the authentication accuracy can be increased at legitimate devices in complex time-
varying environments through exploring multiple attributes, since it is more difficult for the
Spoofer to predict and imitate multiple attributes of Alice. It is also observed from Fig.
5 (a) that upon increasing the time between updates, the misdetection rate of the intelligent
authentication scheme remains stable and robust, while that of the static authentication scheme
increases dramatically. This demonstrates that without the situation-aware adaptation, the
performance of the static authentication scheme will be dramatically decreased in complex
time-varying environments, thus limiting its application in 5G-and-beyond wireless networks.
In order to achieve continuous authentication, the static authentication scheme has to repeat
the authentication process by collecting attribute estimates, obtaining the statistical properties
of the attributes, deriving new test threshold, and then reauthenticating the devices. Through
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(a) Authentication performance comparison between the intelligent authen-
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Fig. 5: Performance of the developed intelligent authentication approach.
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repeating this process, the static authentication scheme requires more computation resources
and longer time latency.
Fig. 5 (b) characterizes the computation cost of both the developed kernel machine learning-
based intelligent scheme and the schemes in [15], namely for incremental aggregated gradient
(IAG), Frank-Wolfe (FW), and distributed Frank-Wolfe (dFW) algorithms. Note that the
abscissa of the first figure indicates the number of authentication times while that of second
figure represents the iteration number in the schemes of [15]. Explicitly, the schemes of [15]
are static and one-time authentication solutions requiring the help of landmarks for collecting
RSSI of signals, while the developed intelligent scheme utilizing N attributes, i.e., N = 1,
N = 2, and N = 3, is continuous and situation-aware. The computation cost of one time
authentication in the developed intelligent scheme is only 400, while the schemes of [15]
require many iterations to reach optimal solutions, thus leading to much higher computation
cost, namely for 77,988. It can also be observed from Fig. 5 (b) that although the larger
number of authentication times increases the computation cost in the developed intelligent
scheme, it provides continuous adaptive authentication and enhanced security for legitimate
devices.
CONCLUSIONS
This article firstly introduced the challenges for the conventional authentication techniques
and the advantages of intelligent authentication. The intelligent authentication design was
developed to enhance security performance in 5G-and-beyond wireless networks. Then the
machine learning paradigms for intelligent authentication were classified into parametric and
non-parametric learning methods, as well as supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement
learning techniques. As a conclusion, machine learning techniques provide a new insight into
authentication under unknown network conditions and unpredictable dynamics, and bring
intelligence to the security management to achieve cost-effective, more reliable, model-free,
continuous, and situation-aware authentication.
FUTURE WORK
In 5G-and-beyond networks, there are also many other research areas in which machine
learning can play a remarkable role and improve the quality of services. We summarize a
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range of future research ideas on machine learning for intelligent security and services as
follows.
The machine learning techniques may be utilized for other security applications, such
as anomaly/fault/intrusion detection, access control, and authorization. This is mainly due
to their ability to provide continuous protection for legitimate communications in 5G-and-
beyond networks. Furthermore, with the ongoing convergence between wireless devices and
human beings, machine learning provides a new insight for studying human-device interaction,
and the interplay between devices and information security, as well as the database security
and data mining, operation systems security, Internet and cyber-security, incident handling,
hacking, biometric techniques, smart cards, infrastructure protection, and risk management.
Through identifying and learning the dynamic adversarial systems, the automatic security
management may be achieved by machine learning techniques.
With the fast development of distributed communication systems (e.g., blockchain), machine
learning may facilitate distributed security management. To be specific, it may be explored
for inferring the mobile users’ decision making and device’s dynamic states under unknown
network conditions for better security performance, for example, adversarial behaviors study
for predicting the possible attacks of adversaries in peer-to-peer networks. The family of
machine learning algorithms may be also applied for better decision making, such as re-
source allocation, distributed computing, analytical thinking, customer orientation, strategy,
and planning. These are expected to be extremely important for 5G-and-beyond wireless
networks to achieve intelligent and autonomous services for human beings.
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